Penn History Review
Volume 26

Issue 2

February 2020

Holy War by Other Means
Jake Mezey
Yale University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/phr

Recommended Citation
Mezey, Jake (2020) "Holy War by Other Means," Penn History Review: Vol. 26 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://repository.upenn.edu/phr/vol26/iss2/5

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/phr/vol26/iss2/5
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Article 5

Holy War by Other Means

Holy War by Other Means
Jake Mezey, Yale University
The medieval crusades in the Middle East are often
regarded in popular culture, and by some historians, as a period
of purely violent and fanatical conflict. The Catholic Church
preached holy wars from the 11th to 14th century, resulting
in the slaughter of thousands of Muslims, Jews, and Christians
in modern day Palestine, Eastern Europe, and throughout the
Mediterranean world. The Seljuks, Ayyubids, and Mameluks led
similarly devastating wars to repulse the crusades and conquer
the Latin kingdoms established in Palestine. In these wars,
these groups invoked jihad, the concept of religious struggle. In
reality, however, the political and cultural interactions between
European “Franks” and local Muslims were far more nuanced.
Franks and Muslims lived in the same cities, traded with each
other in the same markets, and occasionally married each other.
The architecture and art of the medieval Middle East reflects
a highly cosmopolitan array of influences, including those
of Western Europe in many surviving castles and churches.
Muslim historian Usama ibn Munqidh frequently condemned
the crusaders he fought against, while also noting the friends
and allies he made among the Franks.1 Among other kinds
of nonviolent cultural exchange, diplomatic negotiation and
alliances between Frankish and Muslim rulers were a vital aspect
of the political landscape of the holy land during the crusades.
The diplomatic relations between Franks and Muslims
during the Crusades raise questions about how the Crusaders
understood the concept of holy war. If we believe that crusaders
single-mindedly viewed the holy land as belonging to Christianity
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and the Muslims living there as evil heathens, then how can we
explain the alliance of Tancred of Antioch with Ridwan of Aleppo
against the combined forces of Baldwin II and Jawali Saqwa?2
Traditional scholarship on the Crusades has often shied away
from examining the prevalence of political cooperation across
cultural lines and its implications for crusader motivations. One
camp, however, has emerged, which takes the politically expedient
treaties signed between Muslim and Frankish rulers as evidence
that purely material rather than religious motivations were
central to the crusades. While this interpretation could explain
many alliances and treaties between Christian and Muslims
individually, it ignores the context that generated the crusading
movement in the first place, and more importantly the centrality
of religious objectives in many of the political negotiations of
crusaders. That being said, holy war ideology was not so rigid as
to prevent multiple alliances between crusader and Muslim rulers
or peace treaties that compromised on control of religious sites
or allowed for the religious freedom of the local population. This
paper will examine the sources and limits of political negotiation
between crusaders and Muslim rulers by focusing on three
representative examples of diplomacy during several periods.
First, the relationship between the rulers of Antioch and Aleppo
after the First Crusade highlights the integration of the crusader
states into the existing Syrian political landscape. Second, the
peace negotiations between Richard I and Saladin illustrate how
military necessity shaped negotiations during the Third Crusade.
Finally, Frederick II’s successful negotiations with Al-Kamil and
the peaceful transfer of Jerusalem to Christian control in 1229
serves as the most striking examples of cooperation in the face
of ideological conflict between a European and Muslim ruler
during the crusades. I propose an understanding of the crusades
as a process of balancing political interests within a religious
framework and reconciling reality with ideology.
The only book entirely dedicated to the history of
diplomacy during the crusades is Michael Köhler’s work Alliances
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and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle
East: Cross-cultural Diplomacy in the Period of the Crusades. As a
result, this paper is heavily influenced by that book’s arguments
but differs on several key points. Köhler argues that the crusader
states were quickly incorporated as another facet into the natural
political structure that already existed in the Levant. This
argument I fully support, but Köhler goes on to use the wealth
of realist negotiations as evidence against religious motivations
on the part of the Europeans. Köhler’s book points out the
purely material interests of Frankish rulers who he suggests were
mostly trying to seize land and political power. I argue that
spiritual motivations were in fact central to the crusades and
that cross-cultural political negotiation also reflected an internal
negotiation between conflicting ideals and realities. Crusaders
believed in a clear delineation between Christian and heathen
and in a divine mandate to conquer the holy land, but once they
reached Palestine, political realities had to be incorporated into
their conception of what it meant to take the cross.
Yvonne Friedman has written two insightful articles
on the role of alliances and treaties within a religious context.
The first article deals with acceptable and unacceptable alliances
between Franks and Muslims and the second on the negotiation
of peace treaties. I draw heavily on two of her main theories.
First, alliances between Muslims and Christians were viewed as
treasonous in some cases, but in other cases they were successfully
reconciled with religious ideology.3 Second, peaceful exchange
between Muslims and Christians had to be explicitly explained
and justified within the crusader ethos, while warfare did not.4
This paper seeks to build on Friedman’s work and examine the
process by which crusaders reconciled their religious ideology
with diplomacy.
Thomas Asbridge’s 2013 article in the Journal of Medieval
Studies explores the role of negotiation between Richard I and
Saladin. Asbridge shows that diplomacy during the Third
Crusade often served to garner military advantages or to gain a
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stronger negotiating position. He goes on to argue that Richard
I showed far more diplomatic subtlety and skill than previous
scholars had recognized.5 Asbridge’s article, along with Yvonne
Friedman’s previously mentioned works, are the foundation of
the argument put forward in this paper that diplomatic measures
served as an extension of holy war on another front during the
Third Crusade.
Hiroshi Takayama’s article on the reasons behind Frederick
II’s choice to negotiate rather than fight with Al-Kamil has been
incredibly important to the understanding of the Sixth Crusade.
Takayama places Frederick’s expedition within the context of
his long-standing diplomatic relationship and friendship with
Al-Kamil, which preceded his actual journey to the Middle
East in 1229.6 Takayama identifies several key factors that
influenced Frederick’s decision to pursue a diplomatic approach
to crusading, particularly Fredericks’s cosmopolitan upbringing
in Sicily. In this paper, I identify Frederick II as the crusader
leader who was able to reconcile diplomacy and religion to the
greatest degree, and I draw on Takayama’s analysis to explain the
personal factors that allowed him to negotiate successfully across
cultures. Furthermore, I build on Takayama’s argument that
Frederick’s motivations were religious rather than simple political
opportunism.
The lack of original treaties poses a major challenge to
the study of diplomacy between Franks and Muslims during
the crusades. Most of the agreements between rulers may never
have been widely copied, were mostly conducted through spoken
negotiation, and were "signed" only with verbal swearing of oaths.
Therefore, the majority of primary sources available are Latin
and Arabic historians who provide an account of negotiations
conducted many years in the past, for which they were often not
present. Despite this challenge, we can still study the reaction,
memory, and political effects of cross-cultural diplomacy during
the crusades. In many ways, the subjective accounts of medieval
historians are key to understanding the struggles faced in
142
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portraying the religious nature of warfare alongside the limited
and material compromises that each side made with their supposed
enemies.
After the successes of the First Crusade (1096-1099), its
leaders established the “Outremer,” a series of Latin kingdoms on
the Mediterranean coast. These kingdoms existed, in one form
or another, from 1099 until the city of Acre fell in 1291, ending
major crusading in Palestine. For nearly 200 years, however, these
crusader states and their rulers had to navigate the complex network
of alliances and rivals that formed the local political landscape.
Even as these states retained the religious ideology that they had
been founded upon, they also actively allied with Muslim rulers
and engaged in war against common enemies. The First Crusade
owed its very success, in part, to the divided nature of the Seljuk
Turkish principalities in the region and the ability of the crusaders
to exploit these divisions.7 Political conflicts after the First Crusade
also included rivalries among the crusader states, especially as
the Kingdom of Jerusalem attempted to assert its authority over
the other states of the Outremer. The clash between a realpolitik
approach to diplomacy and the religious crusader ethos was
particularly apparent in the Principality of Antioch. After the fall
of the County of Edessa, Antioch was the frontier of the Crusader
States and was both a frequent enemy and sometimes ally of its
Muslim neighbor Aleppo.
Bohemond of Taranto and his Italian Norman entourage
became rulers of the city of Antioch after the Crusaders defeated
the besieging forces of Kerbogah in 1098.8 For the next 30 years,
Bohemond, and his nephew Tancred, expanded and consolidated
their control over the surrounding territory, capturing towns and
playing off rivalries between Muslim rulers. The primary power
relationship in North Western Syria became that of Antioch and
Aleppo. The two cities, and under their respective rulers, vied for
control over the collection of towns and castles between them
while simultaneously attempting to maintain their independence
from the influence of outside forces.
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In 1098, Godfrey of Bouillon, who had occupied the
town of Tell Bashir, was approached by Umar, the Muslim ruler
of the town of Azaz. Umar had rebelled against Ridwan, the
ruler of Aleppo, and needed help from the crusaders to repel
Ridwan’s punitive attack.9 Albert of Aachen records that Umar
initially approached Godfrey through a local Syrian Christian,
but it was after Umar sent his son as a negotiator and hostage
that Godfrey agreed to conclude an alliance and come to his
aid.10 Godfrey had to convince the other leaders of the crusade
in Antioch, Bohemond of Taranto and Raymond of Toulouse, to
assist him in his alliance with Umar. The two lords were hesitant
to ally themselves with a Muslim, so Godfrey had to use religious
imagery to prompt them to assist him, arguing that helping these
Turks would please God.11 Bohemond and Raymond likely were
reluctant to leave Antioch as they were still vying for control of
the city at the time and also may have been jealous of Godfrey’s
opportunity to establish a foothold in Northern Syria. Along
with his religious urgings, Godfrey threatened to refuse aid to
either of them in the future if they refused to participate now.12
This combination eventually prompted the rival leaders to jointly
defeat the forces of Ridwan besieging Azaz, leading Umar to
concluded a treaty of alliance with Godfrey.
The defense of Azaz is the first example of a direct military
alliance between Crusaders and Muslims and suggests a number
of conclusions. First, even as early as 1098, the leaders of the
First Crusade were willing to make an alliance with a Muslim
ruler. Rather than simply concluding a peace treaty or extracting
tribute, Godfrey, Bohemond, and Raymond, actively cooperated
with Umar. Secondly, the Franks were nearly immediately
drawn into the dynamics of local Syrian politics and rivalries.
While the appearance of the Crusaders was met with force by
the rulers whose principalities they threatened, their presence
also provided opportunities for dissatisfied tributaries like Umar
to find new allies to support their rebellions. Finally, personal
gain or advantage and religious ideology do not seem to have
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been mutually exclusive to the leaders of the First Crusade.
argued that assistance to one group of Muslim Turks against
another was included in their divine mandate to retake the holy
land. At the same time, he made appeals to the other leaders’
personal glory and threats about their future political alliances.
Since Godfrey was unafraid to openly state political threats, his
spiritual message was likely not pure propaganda. Considering
the context of the initial calling of the First Crusade, it is hard to
believe that the crusaders used religion as a simple dog-whistle. It
is also undeniable that nearly all the leaders of the First Crusade
were interested in personal gain and glory. The squabble between
Bohemond and Raymond over Antioch, and Baldwin I’s
expedition to seize Edessa attests to the importance of territorial
gain for the crusading elite.13 We must conclude, therefore, that
these were not necessarily contradictory motivations and the
crusaders believed that conquering the Holy Land for Christianity
also meant conquering it for themselves.

Map of the four Crusader states after the First Crusade

The peace signed by Bohemond and Ridwan of Aleppo in
1103 offers another example of the presence of religion in treatyPenn History Review
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making between crusaders and Muslims after the First Crusade.
Alarmed at the expansion of Antioch’s power, Ridwan negotiated
a truce by paying Bohemond 7,000 dinars and ten horses in
exchange for the release of Muslim prisoners.14 Furthermore, Ibn
Shaddad reported that the treaty also required that a cross be
mounted on a minaret of the citadel’s mosque.15 Supposedly, the
cross was later moved with the permission of the crusaders to a
local church in Aleppo, where it was recorded as late as 1124.16
While this detail of the treaty between Bohemond and Ridwan
remains unverified by other sources, it provides an example of
religious negotiation intertwined with political negotiation.
Being momentarily in the stronger position, Bohemond forced a
Christian symbol on Aleppo as a sign of the crusaders’ claim to
the region. The fact that the cross was the symbolic priority for
Bohemond, rather than a coat of arms, is evidence he conceived
his own conquests as an extension of holy war. If, however, he
really did allow the cross to be moved from the mosque to a
church, it shows a remarkable adaptability of ideology to the
necessities of peacemaking. If Bohemond was worried that he
may have overreached and endangered the truce by forcing the
cross into such a public and symbolically important position, it
makes sense that he might quietly have agreed to move it to save
the treaty. It is worth noting that most sources only record the
monetary payment in exchange for prisoners. It would not be
surprising, however, if the negotiations around the placement of
the cross in the city were kept somewhat discrete in the written
record, since the presence and removal of the cross would be
embarrassing to both sides. Even though this truce was signed in
1103, it would not be until after the battle of Harran in 1104 that
a more lasting agreement was negotiated and active cooperation
began between Antioch and Aleppo.
During the Battle of Harran, Baldwin II Count of Edessa
was captured and fell into the hands of Jawali Saqwa of Mosul.17
Bohemond preceded to attempt a crusade against the Byzantine
Empire, leaving his nephew Tancred as regent of Antioch. Tancred
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was also selected as regent of Edessa. As such, Tancred had little
desire to help secure Baldwin’s freedom, preferring instead to try
and consolidate his hold on the two principalities.18 Baldwin was
ransomed the latter wanted to take control of Aleppo.19 According
to different sources, Tancred either refused to return control of
Edessa to Baldwin II, returned the city but tried to hold onto
some of the surrounding land, or would only return the county
in exchange for an oath of vassalage from Baldwin.20 Regardless,
this dispute triggered a conflict between Tancred and Baldwin
at the same time that Jawali threatened Aleppo. Despite the fact
that arbitration in 1108 by the patriarch of Antioch restored
Edessa to him, subsequently assisted Jawali in an attack against
Ridwan of Aleppo due to the oath he had sworn on release.21
Ridwan convinced Tancred to take his side against Jawali and
Baldwin by arguing that if Jawali captured Aleppo, Antioch
would be next. The result was an alliance of Tancred of Antioch
with Ridwan of Aleppo against Baldwin of Edessa and Jawali
of Mosul in 1109. The two sides met in battle somewhere near
Tell Bashir, and Tancred and Ridwan were victorious.22 Later that
year at a council of crusader leaders, Tancred and Baldwin were
reconciled, but their rivalry persisted until Tancred’s death in
1112.
This episode, which is corroborated by multiple Arabic
and Latin sources, reveals the full extent of cross-cultural alliances
immediately after the First Crusade and the factors that shaped
them. Not only did both Baldwin and Tancred form military
alliances with Muslim rulers who they had previously fought, but
when their personal rivalry coincided with conflict between their
allies, they actively fought on opposite sides of the battlefield. In
fact, Baldwin is reported to have executed a Christian convert in
Saruj who had offended his allies under Jawali.23 Hillenbrand and
Köhler note how individual political maneuvering superseded
religious differences in the period after the First Crusade, and
local Turkish rulers were more likely to use the crusader states
to shore up their own principalities than to try and destroy
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them outright.24 Ibn Abi Tayyi records Ridwan as saying that if
Jawali takes Aleppo, “there remains for the Franks, together with
himself [Ridwan], no longer a place in Syria.” Köhler emphasizes
this idea of “no place” as the key to the formations of nearly all
subsequent alliances between neighboring crusader and Muslim
states.25 The rise of an outside eastern power, often originating
from Mosul, would prompt the warring states of Syria to join
together to preserve their independence. This pattern would
be repeated throughout the 12th century, exemplified by the
alliance between the crusader states, specifically the Kingdom of
Jerusalem, with Damascus against the threat of Zengi in 1137.26
Köhler argues that the crusaders were fully integrated into the
political landscape of Syria and behaved according to the same
dynamics that had persisted in the area before their arrival. It is,
however, important to examine details that might complicate the
portrayal of the crusader states as indistinguishable from previous
polities and unaffected by religious conflict.
Fulcher of Chartres claims that Tancred won with the
“help of God.”27 Matthew of Edessa notes Tancred pious character,
and goes on to say that Baldwin’s actions were wicked in the eyes
of God, most likely for his alliance with Jawali.28 Despite the
fact that Tancred illegally withheld Edessa from Baldwin, he was
praised by contemporary sources while Baldwin was condemned.
Asbridge suggests that since Baldwin was the first to associate
with a Turkish ally, he was blamed in the sources, and Tancred was
seen as simply responding with a tit-for-tat.29 It is possible that
the use of a Muslim ally to forcibly resolve a dispute with another
Christian was damnable while enlisting help from the same kind
of ally in self-defense was acceptable. The fact that Fulcher of
Chartres claimed that God was on Tancred’s side, and Mathew
attested to his piety, means that an alliance with Muslims was
not by definition sinful. Some amount of internal negotiation
was certainly necessary, however, to make religious ideology fit
with political reality. could only justify their alliances with the
opposite side by deeming them absolutely necessary.30 Language
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explaining the need to avoid further bloodshed, secure vital
trade routes, or protect Christians in a region always preambled
contemporary descriptions of treaties concluded between
Muslims and crusaders.31 The crusaders clearly viewed war as the
default and thought that peace and alliances were possible but
had to be justified within the context of their religious struggle.
Holy war was flexible, but only if one had a good enough excuse.
Perhaps Baldwin’s alliance failed to meet the test of sufficient
necessity to be justified religiously, leading Matthew of Edessa to
condemn him. On the other hand, Tancred’s alliance of mutual
strategic self defense with Ridwan was acceptable enough to be
divinely sanctioned.
The example of diplomatic relations between Antioch
and Aleppo sheds light on the way Frankish and Muslim leaders
interacted diplomatically after the First Crusade. The politically
divided nature of Syria at the time of the Crusader’s arrival was
key to their surprising success, and the nature of politics after the
individual Frankish lords carved out territories for themselves.
These territories were built on peace treaties concluded with
defeated local rulers, which began the process of integrating the
crusader states into the existing framework of medieval Syria
and Palestine. Individual Muslim rulers also took the presence of
new powerful actors as an opportunity to improve their fortunes
and find potential allies. Similarly, desire for personal gain led
to conflicts and rivalries between the Frankish leaders. Together,
these factors led to instances of conflicting Frankish-Muslim
alliances. Despite these trends, religion and holy war ideology
were still central to the political motivations of crusaders. Personal
gain did not exclude piety for the leaders of the First Crusade and
their contemporaries. Similarly, alliances with Muslims could be
accommodated within the crusading ethos as long as they were
properly justified.
The uneasy equilibrium established in medieval Palestine
was punctuated both by the periodic arrivals of new Europeans
in subsequent numbered Crusades as well as the rise of dominant
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Muslim powers with the ability to overturn the status quo. In the
case of the Third Crusade (1188-1192) both factors were true.
The consolidation of Syria and Egypt under Nur-al Din and
Saladin led to the decisive defeat and capture of Jerusalem after
the battle of Hattin in 1187. The threat to the Outremer and
the loss of Jerusalem triggered the calling of the Third Crusade
and the arrival of a large force primarily under the command of
Richard I of England in 1191.32 The next year of warfare between
Saladin and Richard proved bloody and militarily exhausting for
both sides. Richard I and Saladin each repeatedly used diplomatic
negotiations and overtures of peace as tools to attempt to gain an
advantage over each other.
In 1191, Richard forced the capitulation of the city
of Acre and Saladin engaged in lengthy negotiations over the
surrender of the garrison using the supposed True Cross as a
bargaining chip.33 Saladin may have been attempting to delay
the crusaders’ march on Jerusalem and give him time to ready
the city’s defenses. According to the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et
Gesta Regis Ricardi, Richard eventually suspected Saladin’s tactics
and decided to execute the Muslim prisoners he had taken en
masse.34 This exchange highlights how Saladin used negotiations
to gain a potential military advantage. Concluding a treaty with
the enemy while looking to gain a future advantage corresponds
with the acceptable role of negotiation under jihad or holy war.35
Since Richard was in a position of strength, he felt no compulsion
to spend time compromising with Saladin and instead chose to
send a message as to how he would respond to future ploys.
Asbridge notes how Richard was capable of using similar
negotiating tactics to gain an edge on his opponent. In September,
Richard led his army south from Acre, and his route took him
through the forest of Arsuf.36 Fearing an ambush by Saladin’s
forces in the forest, Richard sent messengers to make contact
and to negotiate a peace. Saladin agreed to the talks and sent his
brother al-Adil as a negotiator. Saladin was waiting for a group
of reinforcements to arrive, and therefore instructed his brother
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to lengthen the negotiations as much as possible. When al-Adil
and Richard met, however, the latter immediately demanded a
full surrender of Saladin’s troops. Saladin’s brother rejected these
terms, after which Richard immediately drew up his army into
battle order and marched through the forest. Asbridge astutely
concludes that calling the talks and immediately torpedoing
them was a deliberate tactic on Richard’s part to catch Saladin
unaware.37 Ibn Shaddad records that Saladin’s army was in no
position to respond to this move and retreated in substantial
disorder.38
Both examples show how diplomatic negotiation served
to further each side’s military position. Richard and Saladin
played a delicate game of offering terms in weaker positions, not
meant to be accepted, but to manipulate the other party into
giving up an advantage. Later, Conrad of Montferrat, one of
Richard’s subordinates, treacherously attempted to negotiate an
alliance with Saladin. His plot never had much hope of being
successful, but it put Richard in a far weaker position, as Saladin
used it to try to force greater concessions from the English king.
Richard responded by offering a marriage alliance between his
sister Joan and Saladin’s brother al-Adil to jointly rule Jerusalem.
This marriage would have run counter to both secular custom
and religious law, but the offer diverted Saladin from conspiring
with Conrad.39 Furthermore, Richard may have intended to sow
distrust in the Ayyubid camp by offering the marriage to al-Adil,
with whom he had developed a publicly friendly relationship,
rather than al-Afdal, who was Saladin’s son and heir.40
During the Third Crusade, diplomacy was not opposed
to the concept of holy war and jihad, but was simply another
tool by which to wage it. The evidence of Richard’s and Saladin’s
interactions throughout the conflict suggest no delineation
of military and diplomatic measures into separate spheres.
Debating the terms of an agreement could give crucial time for
military forces to move into position. An opponent’s willingness
to agree to negotiate might give valuable information about their
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strength.41 Crusade and jihad were waged both on the battlefield
and at the negotiating table. Politics did not necessarily serve
as a sign of compromise on ideological grounds but functioned
instead as a continuation of holy war by other means.
The fact that neither Saladin nor Richard were able to
gain a decisive edge over each other made a diplomatic settlement
between the two sides necessary. Ibn Shaddad recorded an early
exchange between Richard and Saladin. Richard sent a message
that claimed, “Jerusalem is the center of our worship which we
will never renounce even if there were only one of us left.” Saladin
replied by writing, “Let not the king imagine that we shall give
it up, for we are unable to breathe a word of that amongst the
Muslims.”42 Having begun the Third Crusade with the grand
goal of recapturing Jerusalem for Christianity and restoring the
territory of the crusader states, Richard was forced to accept the
reality of negotiating for only minor gains. Similarly, Saladin
was the most prominent proponent of jihad during the 12th
century.43 Although he successfully captured Jerusalem, he was
unable to fully expel the Frankish presence from the holy land.
The inherently limited scope of a compromise acceptable to both
sides represents a direct clash between reality and the directives of
holy war.
How could these two leaders at ideological loggerheads
and a military impasse negotiate a treaty? The highly temporary
treaty they signed was perhaps the only solution. The terms of
the agreement included the demolition of the fortifications of
Ascalon, access to the Holy Sepulcher for Christian Pilgrims, and
a coastal area of land between Tyre and Jaffa being granted to
the crusader states, but the official language of the agreement
was only a three-year truce.44 Neither leader could justify to
their followers, or perhaps even to themselves, any kind of peace
treaty meant to last eternally.45 A lasting agreement, however, was
plainly a necessity for both parties. Richard I suffered from the
combination of a demoralized army, lack of resources, political
turmoil in England, and personal illness.46 However, he still
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claimed that the reason for the three-year period for the truce
was to give him one year to travel back to England, one year
to organize fresh troops, and one year to return.47 Similarly,
Ibn Shaddad claims that Saladin agreed to the truce in order to
give his soldiers time to rest and strengthen the defenses of the
city of Jerusalem.48 Neither of these things happened, however,
as Richard was captured and held for ransom in Austria, and
Saladin died in 1193. Instead, this three-year truce became the
foundation of the last Latin kingdom in the holy land, which
would persist for another century until the fall of Acre in 1291.
Yvonne Friedman used the term “small peace” to accurately
describe the kind of settlement produced by reconciling religious
ideology with political reality.49 Only minor armistices were
possible under the framework of holy war or jihad, mere breaks
while each side marshalled its forces. It was, however, often the
case that leaders repeatedly renewed and expanded these minor
agreements to form a patchwork, uneasy, but often long-lasting
peace. In this way, coexistence was possible even within the
hostile and incompatible religious conflict of the Third Crusade.

The remaining Crusader states during the Third Crusade
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Finally, what is often referred to as the Sixth Crusade
was an utterly exceptional case of diplomacy, as the Holy
Roman Emperor Frederick II and the Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt
Al-Kamil nonviolently negotiated the exchange of Jerusalem.
Before his journey to the holy land, Frederick II had been
excommunicated by Pope Honorius the III for remaining in
Europe and delaying his promise to go on crusade. Moreover,
the Pope blamed Frederick for the failure of the Fifth Crusade
in Egypt. However, in 1229, Fredrick sailed with his army to
Acre where he negotiated the Treaty of Jaffa and Tel-Ajul with
the ruler of Egypt, Al-Kamil. The treaty gave control of Jerusalem
to Frederick and instituted a ten-year truce between Franks and
Muslims in the Holy Land. In return, Frederick guaranteed free
access and protection for Muslim pilgrims and support for AlKamil against his rivals in Syria. Frederick’s ability to seize a
diplomatic opportunity to retake Jerusalem without the use of
force is unique in the history of the crusades, and it seems he
saw no contradiction between the religious mandate of crusading
and the use of negotiation to obtain his strategic goal without
bloodshed. It could simply be that Frederick was lucky and that
he happened to act under favorable political circumstances.
While this is true, it does not explain how Frederick managed to
bring himself to make an agreement that was nearly universally
reviled by other Christians. I argue against one common position
that Frederick negotiated with al-Kamil for non-religious reasons
and merely out of political opportunism. I suggest instead that
Frederick’s ability to reconcile his religious ideology with political
and cultural cooperation allowed him to succeed in regaining
control of Jerusalem in a way no other European figure in the
period was able to.
Though perhaps partially motivated by self-interest,
Frederick II’s decision to retake the city of Jerusalem was primarily
motivated by religious conviction. Frederick II makes his piety
abundantly clear in his letter to Henry III of England, writing:
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at length Jesus Christ, Son of God, beholding from on
high our devoted endurance and patient devotion to
his cause, in his merciful compassion of us at length
brought it about that the Sultan of Babylon [al-Kamil]
restored to us the holy city, the place where the feet of
Christ trod, and where the true worshippers adore the
Father in spirit and in truth.50
Frederick may simply have been trying to win sympathy or praise
from Henry and any other readers by portraying a religious exterior.
That being said, however, Frederick’s repeated religious fervor
in his letters indicates something more about his motivations,
especially if other explanations fail to describe his actions. One
common explanation of Frederick’s decision to go to the holy
land was his marriage to Isabella of Brienne, who carried the title
Queen of Jerusalem in 1225.51 This marriage technically made
Frederick King of Jerusalem, which has led scholars to argue that
claiming this particular crown led Frederick to go on crusade.
However, after negotiating with al-Kamil and crowning himself,
Frederick left the city, never to return. Furthermore, Frederick
made no serious attempt to personally govern the city or extract
revenue from it.52 Installing himself as King of Jerusalem, was
clearly not Frederick’s primary motivation. Another explanation
is that Frederick hoped to improve his reputation with the Pope
or as a Christian in general by retaking Jerusalem. It is clear,
however, that his actions only made Fredrick more unpopular
with the general body of Christians, who supposedly pelted him
with offal when he departed from Acre.53 Frederick’s negotiations
also clearly did little to appease the Pope, who proceeded to call a
crusade against him in 1248.54 This evidence together precludes
the third argument that retaking Jerusalem made Frederick more
powerful. Incurring the enmity of the vast majority of European
Christians as well as having to fight off papal forces most likely
caused more trouble for Frederick than if he had not gone on
crusade at all. Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to conclude
Penn History Review

155

Holy War by Other Means

that Frederick’s primary motivation for retaking Jerusalem was
his religious conviction.
If Frederick’s motivations were religious, how was he
so comfortable negotiating with and making concessions to alKamil, a Muslim ruler? Frederick’s upbringing as a youth on the
island of Sicily was key to his early understanding of Islam and
has been commented on by multiple sources.55 Growing up in
an area and court life that certainly included Muslims, Frederick
had to learn how to interact with members of another religion
on a daily basis, even as he himself was expected to behave as a
devout Christian. While nearly all previous Crusaders had little
to no experience with the Islamic world, Frederick’s comfort in
communicating across cultural lines was likely a key factor in
the success of his relations with al-Kamil. Hiroshi Takayama
analyzes the longstanding relationship between al-Kamil and
Frederick that both preceded and outlasted the events of the
Sixth Crusade. Seventeenth century accounts of inscriptions on
the walls of the Cathedral of Cefalu suggest that Frederick might
have sent envoys to al-Kamil as early as 1217.56 Furthermore,
Frederick maintained such good relations with the Sultan that
they frequently exchanged correspondence and even poetry after
he had returned to Europe.57 This friendship may have been a
crucial factor in the peaceful conclusion of the treaty of Jaffa and
Tel-Ajul. The main reason al-Kamil offered Jerusalem to Frederick
was to gain the Emperor’s support against Kamil’s brother alMuzzam.58 However, al-Muzzam died before Frederick’s arrival
at Acre.59 Despite the disappearance of his main rival, al-Kamil
still chose to conclude the treaty with Frederick. This decision
runs explicitly counter to the established dynamic under which
agreements between Frank and Muslim had to be justified by
necessity. Thus, the success of the sixth Crusade was exceptional
in that a Christian and Muslim ruler were able to reach an
agreement purely diplomatically, which shocked the sensibilities
of their coreligionists. The foundation of this agreement was the
personal relationship built up over time between Frederick II and
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al-Kamil.

Painting of Frederick II (center left) meeting with Sultan Al-Kamil (center right)

This paper has sought to highlight several trends in
diplomatic negotiations between Christian and Muslim rulers
during the Crusades. First, conducting diplomacy for personal
gain was not seen as necessarily contradictory to the ideology of
holy war. Crusaders and their Muslim counterparts incorporated
the negotiation of treaties into their religious framework as the
necessity arose. Diplomacy also served as both an extension of
war and as the foundation of numerous small peace agreements
that made coexistence in medieval Palestine and Syria possible.
A crucial aspect of understanding the crusades historically is the
examination of the balancing and reconciliation between abstract
and unlimited religious ideology and the limited and complex
political realities of war and peace.
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